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I. INTRODUCTION
What is commonly perceived as the historical dimension of precedent is
the fact that the context in which later courts cite an opinion raises issues
other than those dealt with in the original decision. This article attempts to
demonstrate that another aspect of the historical dimension of precedent is
that knowledge of the precise facts and context in which the original deci-
sion was rendered may hold unsuspected significance for problems con-
fronting a later society.
Knowledge of precise facts becomes particularly important because ju-
dicial precedent often acts as a limit on the rights of the majority. A proper
understanding of the factual underpinnings of a case may, therefore, provide
unsuspected precedent for limits on majority power; or conversely, for limits
on the involvement of the courts in protecting a complaining minority. Fur-
ther, the historical significance of cases, accurately understood, may provide
consistency for what might otherwise appear to be unprincipled judicial de-
cision making.
A recently prominent school of legal historians perceives nineteenth
century American common law as a process utilized in the service of indus-
trial and commercial growth:
[Bly 1820 the process of common law decision making had taken
on many of the qualities of legislation. As judges began to con-
ceive of common law adjudication as a process of making and not
merely discovering legal rules, they were led to frame general doc-
trines based on a self-conscious consideration of social and eco-
nomic policies.'
This thesis has been vigorously challenged with regard to the pre-Civil War
period by a study (focused on diversity jurisdiction cases in the federal
courts) that claims to demonstrate that the pre-Civil War legal order is best
understood as "a decisional process or function that was designed to vindi-
cate the legitimate and discernable expectations of the parties to any given
* Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A., 1955, Yale University; M.A., 1963, Clare College,
Cambridge; LL.B., Ph.D., 1962, Yale University.
1. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 2 (1977).
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dispute." 2
The municipal bond cases, of which Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,3 de-
cided in 1863, is the most generally well known, provide one of the bases for
restricting to the pre-Civil War period the claim that courts utilized common
law doctrines solely to enforce the reasonably expectations of the parties.
The municipal bond cases. . . squarely represent the kinds of
cases in which the burden was placed upon noncitizens to deter-
mine whether there were requirements of local law that affected a
transaction and, if so, whether they had been complied with. The
bonds were, to the knowledge of everyone, exclusively creatures of
local law. . . . Consequently, what the Supreme Court actually
did in [the municipal bond cases] was to create a federal exemption
in favor of noncitizens. . . .4
The exemption referred to is restricted to noncitizens since, in the absence of
a constitutional issue (and the municipal bond cases were not perceived as
raising issues of federal constitutional dimensions), a dispute among citizens
prior to the introduction of the federal question jurisdiction was restricted to
the state courts.
Whenever the "federal exemption in favor of noncitizens" consisted of
upholding the validity of bonds in a case where the state courts would have
refused to enforce payment, and the Gelpcke decision represents one such
instance, the result could be characterized as one in which "the legitimate
and discernable expectations of the parties" were subordinated to the need
to continue attracting the capital investments required for "industrial and
commercial growth." As is possible in all diversity jurisdiction cases, how-
ever, such a decision raised the incongruous possibility of state and federal
courts resolving the same dispute in opposite ways. It was this possibility, an
inevitable concomitant of our federal judicial system, that required the dis-
sent in a recent United States Supreme Court decision to note that:
Under [our] approach, the federal courts do not have jurisdiction
to review every foreclosure proceeding in which the debtor claims
that there has been a procedural defect constituting a denial of due
process of law. Rather, the Federal District Court's jurisdiction
• . . is limited to challenges to the constitutionality of the state pro-
cedure itself--challenges of the kind considered in North Georgia
Finishing, Fuentes, and Shevin.5
The dissent's repeated insistence that the majority's result is inconsis-
tent with prior decisions6 reflects its concern about the lack of an historical
basis which either justifies or clarifies the majority's decision: a concern bot-
tomed on the fact that the demands we make on the law's definition of legal
relationships includes not only uniformity among courts, but also the formu-
2. R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 4 (1977).
3. 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 175 (1863).
4. R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITrEN, THE CONSTITUrION AND THE COMMON LAW 119 (1977).
5. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 177 (1978).
6. See, e.g., note 7 bira and accompanying text.
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lation of definitions that remain stable over time, which are uniformly ap-
plied to all persons perceived as similarly situated.
The significance of precedent in the legal system demonstrates the pro-
fession's awareness of the importance of the past, and the dramatic perform-
ances that often occur at criminal trials in connection with disputes
concerning the intent of the accused demonstrate that lawyers are fully
aware of the difficulties involved in the task of historical reconstruction.
Specifically, what both lawyers and historians realize is that the meaning of
any given event is dependent on the context in terms of which it is perceived,
but that an excessive regard for the context is as likely as ignorance of its
importance to lead to a distortion of the meaning of the event.
Since decisions are the events dealt with by legal historians, what this
article hopes to demonstrate is that neither of the schools of legal history
described in this Introduction can adequately account for the decision in
Ge/pcke. To avoid scrutiny of the legal history underlying past decision in-
vites senseless results; to criticize vacillating courts, or courts that have failed
to follow prior decisions without a proper perspective of the historical di-
mension, welcomes ignorance. In this sense, what we mean when we say
that every age writes its own history is that the questions with which each
age struggles define the context in terms of which prior events are properly
perceived. The method used to demonstrate this is a presentation of the
history of the recent Supreme Court case, Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, and
then Gelpcke, in order to clarify the questions posed by the recent decision.
II. FL,4GG BROTHERS, INC. v BROOKS-THE HISTORICAL QUESTIONS
On June 13, 1973, Shirley Brooks and her family were evicted from
their apartment, and the city marshal arranged for their possessions to be
stored by Flagg Brothers, Inc., in its warehouse. After a series of disputes
over the amounts being claimed for moving and storing the possessions,
Flagg Brothers, Inc., on August 25, 1973, sent Brooks a letter threatening to
sell the possessions if the payments were not made within 10 days, a method
of enforcing a warehouseman's hen on goods entrusted to him for storage
permitted by New York Uniform Commercial Code section 7-210.
7
7. U.C.C. § 7-210:
ENFORCEMENT OF WAREHOUSEMAN'S LIEN
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a warehouseman's lien may be enforced by pub-
lic or private sale of the goods in bloc or in parcels, at any time or place and on any terms which
are commercially reasonable, after notifying all persons known to claim an interest in the goods.
Such notification must include a statement of the amount due, the nature of the proposed sale
and the time and place of any public sale. The fact that a better price could have been obtained
by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the warehouseman is
not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable
manner. If the warehouseman either sells the goods in the usual manner in any recognized
market therefor, or if he sells at the price current in such market at the time of his sale, or if he
has otherwise sold in conformity with commercially reasonable practices among dealers in the
type of goods sold, he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner. A sale of more goods
than apparently necessary to be offered to insure satisfaction of the obligation is not commer-
cially reasonable except in cases covered by the preceding sentence.
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When a series of subsequent letters failed to resolve the dispute as to the
validity of the charges being claimed by Flagg Brothers, Inc., a class action
was instituted in federal district court seeking a declaration that the sale
permitted by section 7-2 10 would violate the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. All parties agreed to dismiss the
city marshal from the case. On July 7, 1975, finding that the warehouse-
man's conduct was not that of the state, the district court dismissed the suit
for want of jurisdiction. 8 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, al-
though recognizing that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
reached a contrary conclusion in interpreting an identical California stat-
ute,9 found sufficient state involvement to invoke the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and consequently reversed the judgment of the district
court. to
On May 15, 1978, holding that the "total absence of overt official in-
volvement plainly distinguishes this case from earlier decisions imposing
procedural restrictions on creditors' remedies such as North Georgia Finish-
(2) A warehouseman's lien on goods other than goods stored by a merchant in the course
of his business may be enforced only as follows:
(a) All persons known to claim an interest in the goods must be notified.
(b) The notification must be delivered in person or sent by registered or certified letter to
the last known address of any person to be notified.
(c) The notification must include an itemized statement of the claim, a description of the
goods subject to the lien, a demand for payment within a specified time not less than ten days
after receipt of the notification, and a conspicuous statement that unless the claim is paid within
that time the goods will be advertised for sale and sold by auction at a specified time and place.
(d) The sale must conform to the terms of the notification.
(e) The sale must be held at the nearest suitable place to that where the goods are held or
stored.
(f) After the expiration of the time given in the notification, and advertisement of the sale
must be published once a week for two weeks consecutively in a newspaper of general circula-
tion where the sale is to be held. The advertisement must include a description of the goods, the
name of the person on whose account they are being held, and the time and place of the sale.
The sale must take place at least fifteen days after the first publication. If there is no newspaper
of general circulation where the sale is to be held, the advertisement must be posted at least ten
days before the sale in not less than six conspicuous places in the neighborhood of the proposed
sale.
(3) Before any sale pursuant to this section any person claiming a right in the goods may
pay the amount necessary to satisfy the lien and the reasonable expenses incurred under this
section. In that event the goods must not be sold, but must be retained by the warehouseman
subject to the terms of the receipt and this Article.
(4) The warehouseman may buy at any public sale pursuant to this section.
(5) A purchaser in good faith of goods sold to enforce a warehouseman's lien takes the
goods free of any rights of persons against whom the lien was valid, despite noncompliance by
e warehouseman with the requirements of this section.
(6) The warehouseman may satisfy his lien from the proceeds of any sale pursuant to this
section but must hold the balance, if any, for delivery on demand to any person to whom he
would have been bound to deliver the goods.
(7) The rights provided by this section shall be in addition to all other rights allowed by
law to a creditor against his debtor.
(8) Where a lien is on goods stored by a merchant in the course of his business the lien
may be enforced in accordance with either subsection (1) or (2).
(9) The warehouseman is liable for damages caused by failure to comply with the re-
quirements for sale under this section and in case of willful violation is liable for conversion.
8. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
9. Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976).
10. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc., 553 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1977).
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ing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)";" the
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Mr. Justice
Brennan took no part in the case.' 2 Mr. Justice Stevens, joined by Mr. Jus-
tice White and Mr. Justice Marshall, dissented on the basis that "the Court's
holding is fundamentally inconsistent with, if not foreclosed by, [those] prior
decisions. . . .1 3 "In each of these cases a finding of state action was a
prerequisite to the Court's decision. The Court today seeks to explain these
findings on the ground that in each case there was some element of 'overt
official involvement.' "14 "If it is unconstitutional for a State to allow a pri-
vate party to exercise a traditional state power because the State supervision
of that power is purely mechanical, the State surely cannot immunize its
actions from constitutional scrutiny by removing even the mechanical super-
vision." 15
Finally, it is obviously true that the overwhelming majority of
disputes in our society are resolved in the private sphere. But it is
no longer possible, if it ever was, to believe that a sharp line can be
drawn between private and public actions. The Court today holds
that our examination of state delegations of power should be lim-
ited to those rare instances where the State has ceded one of its
"exclusive" powers. As indicated, I believe that this limitation is
neither logical nor practical. More troubling, this description of
what is state action does not even attempt to reflect the concerns of
the Due Process Clause, for the state-action doctrine is, after all,
merely one aspect of this broad constitutional protection.
In the broadest sense, we expect government "to provide a
reasonable and fair framework of rules which facilitate commercial
transactions . . ." Mitchell v. WT Grant Co., 416 U.S., at 624
(POWELL, J., concurring). This "framework of rules" is premised
on the assumption that the State will control nonconsensual depri-
vations of private property and that the State's control will, in turn,
be subject to the restrictions of the Due Process Clause. The power
to order legally binding surrenders of property and the constitu-
tional restrictions on that power are necessary correlatives in our
system. In effect, today's decision allows the State to divorce these
two elements by the simple expedient of transferring the imple-
mentation of its policy to private parties. Because the Fourteenth
Amendment does not countenance such a division of power and
responsibility, I respectfully dissent.'
6
Whether, given that it forgot the history of prior cases, the majority is
correct is open to debate. An understanding of the historical environment of
.11. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978).
12. Id at 166.
13. Id at 169.
14. Id at 173.
15. Id at 175.
16. Id at 178 (footnotes omitted).
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cases, however, is usually a necessary prerequisite to sound judicial decision
making. The following sections attempt to illustrate the interrelationships
between history and the judicial decision making process.
III. THE CASE OF GELPCKE V CITY OF DUBUQUE
()
Herman Gelpcke was a New York investor, who in 1860 was president
of the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad and held a mortgage under which he
acted as trustee for that railroad.' 7 He also held a mortgage on, and was an
important stockholder in, the Dubuque and Western Railroad.' 8
Section 27 of the legislative act incorporating the city of Dubuque,
which was adopted on February 24, 1847, provided that "whenever, in the
opinion of the city council, it is expedient to borrow money for any public
purpose, the question shall be submitted to the citizens of Dubuque. . .."19
A bond issue to aid the Dubuque Western Railroad in an amount up to
$250,000 was approved by the required majority of the Dubuque electorate
in December, 1856. The bonds were issued as of July 1, 1857, and bore
coupons for interest payable every half year in the city of New York. The
bonds recited that they were given "for and in consideration" of stock of the
Dubuque Western Railroad Company, and that for due payment "the said
city is hereby pledged, in accordance with the Code of Iowa, and an act of
the General Assembly of the State of Iowa, of January 28, 1857."
When the coupons were not paid, Gelpcke sued the city of Dubuque in
the Iowa District Court. The bonds were held unenforceable under applica-
ble state law, and judgment was entered for the city of Dubuque. 20 In the
Supreme Court of the United States it was
insisted that in cases involving the construction of a State law or
constitution, this court is bound to follow the latest adjudication of
the highest court of the State. Leingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599,
is relied upon as authority for the proposition. In that case this
court said it would follow "the latest settled adjudications."
Whether the judgment in question can, under the circumstances,
be deemed to come within that category, it is not now necessary to
determine. 2'
Lefflngwell was not regarded as governing the decision in Ge/pcke v. City
of Dubuque because "[i]t cannot be expected that this court will follow every
• * * oscillation [of the highest court of the state], from whatever cause aris-
ing, that may possibly occur. . . .To hold otherwise would be as unjust as
to hold that rights acquired under a statute may be lost by its repeal. ' 22
17. REPORT OF THE DUBUQUE AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 2 (1860).
18. THE RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE DUBUQUE WESTERN RAILROAD 18 (1858).
19. An Act to Incorporate the City of Dubuque, ch. 82, § 27, 1846-1847 Iowa Acts 114.
20. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 178 (1863).
21. Id at 205.
22. id at 205-06.
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We are not unmindful of the importance of uniformity in the
decisions of this court, and those of the highest local courts, giving
construction of their own States. It is the settled rule of this court
in such cases, to follow the decisions of the State courts. But there
have been heretofore, in the judicial history of this court, as doubt-
less there will be hereafter, many exceptional cases. We shall never
immolate truth, justice and the law, because a State tribunal has
erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice.
23
Mr. Justice Miller dissented. 24 Conceding that the "moral force" of the
majority's position was "unquestionably very great, ' 25 he predicted "that
none of my brethren who concur in the opinion just delivered, would go so
far as to say that the inferior State courts would have a right to disregard the
decision of their own appellate court, and give judgment that the bonds were
valid. Such a course would be as useless, as it would be destructive of all
judicial subordination. ' 26 But, he noted, "this is in substance what the ma-
jority of the court have decided [for suits brought in federal courts sitting in
Iowa]. ' ' 27 Justice Miller pointed out that:
The Supreme Court of Iowa is not the first or the only court
which has changed its rulings on questions as important as the one
now presented. I understand the doctrine to be in such cases, not
that the law is changed, but that it was always the same as ex-
pounded by the later decision, and that the former decision was
not, and never had been, the law, and is overruled for that very
reason. The decision of this court contravenes this principle, and
holds that the decision of the court makes the law, and in fact, that
the same statute or constitution means one thing in 1853, and an-
other thing in 1859. For it is impliedly conceded, that if these
bonds had been issued since the more recent decision of the Iowa
court, this court would not hold them valid.
28
Mr. Justice Miller's "understanding [of] the doctrine. . . in such cases"
rests on his refusal to accept the proposition he finds basic to the majority's
rationale-"The decision of the court makes the law." It should be noted,
however, that this judicial disagreement concerning the nature and source of
law seems not to be regarded as relevant by legal historians in their analysis
of Gelpcke. As put by Charles Fairman, author of the Holmes Devise His-
tory of the Supreme Court for the post-Civil War period:
Whether the Iowa court had done well or ill in overruling a
precedent is not the issue in a critique of Gelpcke v. Dubuque. The
question is, on what rational basis can one justify the Supreme
Court's refusal to follow the State Court's decision on a matter of
23. Id at 206-07.
24. Id at 207.
25. Id at 210.
26. Id at 208.
27. Id
28. Id at 211.
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State law? 29
(i)
Iowa v. Wapello County,30 the decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa
that Gelpcke refused to follow, made explicit why it was felt necessary in
some circumstances to take an action that could be perceived as overruling a
precedent. In connection with the "expectations of the parties" and the im-
pact of its ruling on "commercial and industrial growth," the state court
noted that:
[W]e are not insensible that. . . at this late date, we are liable to
expose ourselves and our people to the charge of insincerity and
bad faith, and perhaps that which is still worse, inflict a great
wrong upon innocent creditors and bondholders-consequences
which we would most gladly have avoided, if we could have done
so, and been true to the obligations of conscience and principle.3'
That the obligation felt to be compelling involved something other than
what were understood to be the rules of law was also made clear:
We know, however, that there is such a thing as a moral sense
and a public faith which may be successfully appealed to, when the
law is impotent to afford relief. These sentiments, we cannot but
believe, still reside in the hearts and consciences of our people, and
may be invoked to save themselves and their state from seeming
bad faith.32
The printed report of the Ge/pcke decision in the United States
Supreme Court begins by setting out provisions of the "Constitution of the
State of Iowa, adopted in 1846. . .. ,,33 Among these provisions, article 7
provided that "[tihe General Assembly shall not in any manner create any
debt or debts ...which .. .shall ...exceed the sum of one hundred
thousand dollars," 34 and article 8, section 2, that "[t]he State shall not di-
rectly or indirectly become a stockholder in any corporation. 3 5 These pro-
visions were typical in state constitutions adopted in the middle of the 19th
century, reflecting the disastrous experiences during the first half of the cen-
tury in connection with debts incurred as the consequence of public funding
of "internal improvements" such as roads and canals. How to fund such
improvements represented one of the most significant political issues of the
day, and in the constitutional convention which drafted the document
quoted in Gelpcke, a Whig minority unsuccessfully argued for more moder-
ate restrictions.36
29. 6 C. FAIRMAN, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888, pt. 1, at 937 (1971).
30. Iowa v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388 (1862).
31. Id at 423.
32. Id at 424.
33. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 176 (1863).
34. Id
35. Id
36. B. SHAMBAUGH, FRAGMENTS OF THE DEBATES OF THE IOWA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
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The difficulty faced by Iowa Democrats in connection with supporting
internal improvement programs was the national party position, firmly
maintained since the Presidency of Andrew Jackson, that funding for such
programs should come from state and local rather than federal sources. As a
result, the new Republican party, like the Whigs, could portray themselves,
within Iowa, as more aware than their Democratic opponents of the need to
raise capital for continued "industrial and commercial growth." In 1856, for
example, when a six-year campaign waged by Iowa Democrats in Congress
succeeded in obtaining passage of a bill granting over three million acres of
land for railroad construction, the Republicans, in control of the governor-
ship and state legislature, rather than accepting the bill as a recognition by
the national Democratic party of Iowa's need for internal improvements,
accepted the grant only after two weeks of a special session devoted to pro-
claiming Republican dedication to the cause of railroad construction.
At this time, the Supreme Court of Iowa was regarded as having ap-
proved the constitutionality of county bonds in its 1853 ruling in Dubuque
County v. Dubuque & Pacific Railroad Co. ,37 the first case in which the valid-
ity of bonds issued in connection with railroad construction had been chal-
lenged. The county judge had proclaimed an election at which the bonds
were approved, but the county delayed the process of their issuance by
bringing an action in a state district court challenging the regularity and
legality of the election proceedings, the constitutionality of the vote in light
of the constitutional provisions restricting state power to hold stock and in-
cur debt,38 and the statutory authorization for the election, which had been
proclaimed under a provision that referred only to roads, bridges and public
buildings. 39
The judgment of the Iowa District Court, holding the bond issue valid,
was affirmed in the Iowa Supreme Court by two of the three judge panel.
The majority opinion rejected the constitutional challenge on the basis that:
OF 1844 AND 1846, at 341, 347-55 (1900). For a summary of the Whig position on this issue, see also a
public address in the Iowa Standard, July 20, 1846, at 1, col. 2:
The inventive spirit of the age, is at work to annihilate time and space, and bring the markets of
the East and the South to the doors of the Western Agriculturist. If we would maintain our
proper position in the Union, we must march in the footsteps of our Western sisters, and engage
in these undertakings. To refuse, is to exclude our products from the great markets of the
world. . . . The article on State Debts is tantamount to an inhibition of the construction of such
works by the State government. . . . It not only deprives us of the use of foreign capital, which
might easily be obtained at a reasonable interest, but it throws the whole burden of the con-
struction of such works upon the citizens of the State. It deprives the people collectively of a
right they possess individually--the right to throw their credit and character into market, and
make them serve the purposes of capital. The State government is but an aggregate individual,
is subject to the same laws of finance, which govern single persons, and should possess the same
liberty to make contracts that individual citizens enjoy.
37. 4 Greene I (Iowa 1853).
38. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
39. The county judge may submit to the people of his county at any regular election or at a
special one called for that purpose, the question whether money may be borrowed to aid in the
erection of public buildings; whether the county will construct, or aid to construct, any road or
bridge which may call for an extraordinary expenditure.
IOWA CODE § 114 (1851).
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HeinOnline -- 4 J. Corp. L. 365 1978-1979
The Journal of Corporation Law
There is quite as much identity and affinity between a citizen and
the state, as there is between a county and the state. But no one
will contend that a constitutional restriction upon the state govern-
ment is also a restriction upon a citizen of the state; how then can it
be claimed that such a state restriction should be enforced against a
county?
4 0
The statutory challenge was disposed of on the basis that "We can see no
good reason [to restrict the meaning of the words 'any road' to common
roads, streets and lanes]. '41
As to the statutory interpretation of the words "any road" to include the
portion of a railroad line within the county, Judge Kinney in dissent noted
that a clause referring to "any work of internal improvement" had been
stricken from the provision at issue by the legislature,4 2 that the succeeding
legislature twice rejected a law enabling counties to assist the building of
railroads, 43 and that another provision in the Code defined the word "road"
to "include public bridges, and. . . [as] . . . equivalent to the. . . county
road, common road, and state road." 4 As Mr. Justice Miller noted in his
dissent:
The opinions of the court were by law filed with the clerk, and by
him copied into a book kept for that purpose. The dissenting opin-
ion of Judge Kinney, a very able one, is there found in its proper
place, in which he says, he has never seen the opinion of the major-
ity. No such opinion is to be found in the clerk's office, as I have
verified by a personal examination. Nor was it ever seen, until it
was published five years afterwards. . . by one of the judges, who
had ceased to be either judge or official reporter at the time it was
published.45
The judge referred to, who published the opinions in 1858, was the author of
the majority opinion.
The persistence of legal doubts in Iowa about the validity of railroad
bonds is evidenced by the fact that, during 1856 and 1857, the legislature
40. Dubuque County v. Dubuque & Pacific R.R. Co., 4 Greene 1, 3 (Iowa 1853).
41. Id at 4.
42. Id at 13.
43. Id at 15.
44. Id See also id at 16:
I have not been insensible of the weighty consequences suspended upon the decision of this
case. I have endeavored in vain to prevent a decision which I believe erroneous, and which
must sooner or later be so declared. Counties have voted stock for railroad purposes from fifty
to four hundred thousand dollars each, with indifference as to payment, which to my mind is
most alarming. But few of the counties in comparison to the entire number intrusted have as
yet voted, and it is but a fair deduction unless this spirit is soon checked, that the state will not
be less than ten million of dollars in debt within the next five years for railroad purposes alone.
The interest upon this enormous sum will not be less than seven hundren thousand dollars per
annum, all of which must be raised by direct tax upon the people. In these times of feverish
excitement, when the public mind is jostled off from its true balance, when public and private
economy as well as natural justice are lost sight of in the clamor for public improvements,
would it not be well to pause, or refer back to first principles, and reflect upon consequences
which involve a sacrifice of constitutional rights, loss of private property, and an utter perver-
sion of county and city organization.
45. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 175, 217 (1863).
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passed a series of enactments either legalizing previously held elections or
authorizing the holding of a specific election dealing with bond issuance,
46
including one dealing with the bonds at issue in Gelpcke, which was cited at
the beginning of the report of the case.47 More specifically, in terms of judi-
cial rulings by the Iowa Supreme Court on the question of the constitution-
ality of county bonds, Iowa v. Wapello Count/48 noted that:
Dubuque County v. The Dubuque & Pacific Railroad Company
, where it was held by a majority of the court that the power
had been conferred by § 114 of the Code of 1851, was followed in
its enunciation by a very clear and able dissenting opinion from
Judge Kinney.
The last decision by our predecessors was in the case of Stokes
et al v. The County of Scott, . . where it was held that this power
had not been conferred.
The intermediate decisions were an acquiescence in the for-
mer of these, by two members of the court, not upon the ground
that the Legislature had in fact authorized the exercise of any such
power by the cities or counties in this State (for about this they had
expressed very great doubts, and affected not to believe it), but be-
cause they felt themselves so much committed and trammeled by
the previous decision and subsequent legislative recognition, that
they did not feel themselves at liberty, from public considerations,
to unsettle the construction which the first decision had given to the
Code on the subject.
In this aspect of the case it will be perceived that the question
now under consideration is an entirely open one in this State, and
that this court as now constituted must pass upon it as an original
question, wholly unaffected by the doctrine of stare decisis; or, if
influenced at all by prior decisions, we should be inclined to follow
the later rather than the earlier opinions.
49
In the Stokes case, decided in 1859, Chief Judge Wright repeated the
statutory interpretation arguments50 advanced in dissent by Judge Kinney,
5
'
and also held the bond issue beyond the constitutional power of the county.
46. An Act to Legalize the Issuing of Corporation Bonds of Ft. Madison, ch. 25, 1856 Iowa Acts 73
(extra session); An Act to Authorize Certain Towns Therein Named to Subscribe to the Capital Stock of
Railroad Corporations, and to Issue Bonds to Aid in the Construction of Railroads, ch. 29, 1856 Iowa
Acts 75 (extra session); An Act to Authorize the City of Dubuque, St. Peters and St. Paul Railroad
Company, ch. 178, 1856-1867 Iowa Acts 270, An Act of Authorize the City of Dubuque to Issue Bonds to
Aid in the Construction of Certain Railroads Named Therein, ch. 205, 1856-1857 Iowa Acts 339; An Act
to Authorize the City of Keokuk to Levy a Direct Tax, Not Exceeding $150,000, for the Benefit of the
Keokuk and Fort Des Moines Railroad Company, ch. 239, 1856-1857 Iowa Acts 399.
47. An Act Authorizing City of Dubuque to Issue Bonds to aid in the Construction of Certain
Railroads Named Therein, ch. 205, 1856-1857 Iowa Acts 339.
48. Iowa v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388 (1862).
49. Id at 395.
50. Stokes v. County of Scott, 10 Iowa 166, 173-77 (1859).
51. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text. As the Wapello court noted:
The great marvel is, that this fragment of legislative history, should have escaped the notice
of our predecessors who first gave a construction of this section of the Code. Of course, we are
not at liberty to suppose for an instant, that with a knowledge of these facts, they could have
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Judge Woodward, however, held the issue valid, and while Judge Stockton
concurring in the Chief Judge's interpretation of the statutory provision,
stated that, "As to the power in the legislature, there has been at no time any
doubt in my mind. I think the power may by them be conferred upon the
counties to take the stock and issue the bonds without any constitutional
objection .. *"52
1857, the year in which the Iowa legislature retroactively attempted to
confer such a power on Dubuque in connection with the bonds at issue in
Gelpcke, saw a panic which lowered railroad construction to 90 miles of
track from 186 the previous year. In 1858, the depression was sufficiently
severe that only 35 miles were laid, and, because of delays in the federal
certification process, no help was obtained from the lands granted for rail-
road construction in 1856, certification of which depended on the miles of
track laid each year. 53
The panic, together with lack of success in attempting to obtain a bond
issue in England, drove the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company to the
edge of bankruptcy.-4 As a result, in 1858, Platt Smith, a vice-president of
the railroad and an attorney in Dubuque, proposed, at a public meeting in
Buchanan County, a plan whereby the county would institute a property tax
in effect payable in farm products, the proceeds from the sale of which
would be used to buy stock in the railroad company. The proposal failed of
approval at a special county election. 55 Earlier in the year, when a bond
issue for the railroad was proposed in Hamilton County, a local newspaper
adverted to the 1856 land grants:
It is. . . a query in the minds of many, as to what the Company
want these bonds for. They have a most munificent land
grant-sufficient to build the road and leave a large surplus-and
have had nearly $2,000,000 worth of private property donated to
them along the line of the Road. . . . In these hard times, every
dollar of taxation, present or prospective, makes the people
groan.56
(ii)
Mr. Justice Miller described Iowa v. Wapello County in the following
terms: "The opinion in that case, delivered by Judge Lowe, covers the whole
ground . . . [and] is exhausting, able, and conclusive. '5 7
In that decision, after "admit[ting] that if the question before us in-
volved no other principle than that of a right construction of a statutory
adopted a construction so utterly at variance with the known and declared intention of the
Legislature ...
Iowa v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388, 398 (1862). See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
52. Stokes v. County of Scott, 10 Iowa 166, 179 (1859).
53. J. PARISH, GEORGE WALLACE JONES 206-09 (1912).
54. REPORT OF THE DUBUQUE AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 12-18 (1858).
55. HISTORY OF BUCHANAN COUNTY, IOWA 93-96 (Williams Bros. pub. 1881).
56. Hamilton Freeman, Jan. 28, 1858, at 2, col. 3.
57. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 175, 218-19 (1863).
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enactment, [the writer of this opinion] could not be persuaded to disturb
adjudications under which large interests have been acquired, '58 Judge
Lowe defined the question to be resolved as "whether the Legislature can,
under any circumstances, pass a valid law which will make it lawful for a
county or city in its corporate capacity to subscribe stock in a railroad com-
pany." 59 Given the definition of cities and counties as "intermediate agen-
cies or instruments of government, standing between the people and the
sovereignty of the State, for the purpose of devising and executing certain
local police regulations," 6° "[i]t will. . be conceded, [he argued] that coun-
ties exercising the taxing power must be restricted to purposes alone munici-
pal and local." 6 1 The railroads, on the other hand, were both private and of
interest to more than the local community. As a result, because "I have
shown by the laws of this state, that, under certain circumstances, the indi-
vidual property of the citizen of Wapello county, can be taken to pay the
debts of this [railway] company, growing out of their responsibilities as car-
riers,"' 62 Judge Lowe concluded that, as to "the two hundred citizens of
Wapello, who voted against the railroad subscription, '63 but are subject to
the liability,
that it was in consequence of an act of the Legislature, conferring
the power on the county of Wapello to subscribe, in her municipal
capacity, stock in a railroad company. Nothing can be clearer to
the mind of the writer of this opinion than that the exercise of this
power and freedom in the choice of pursuits cannot stand together.
If such a law can be upheld as a rightful exercise of legislative
power, then the reserved rights of the citizen, as well as the guaran-
ties of the Constitution, are all a myth.64
Those words were written in 1862. Three years earlier, with state elec-
tions approaching, Ralph P. Lowe, who was then serving as governor, would
have been pleased to act in conformity with Iowa's two-term tradition by
accepting renomination from his Republican party. The party convention,
however, nominated Samuel J. Kirkwood for governor by acclamation, and,
because Lowe had agreed to stand aside, nominated him for election to the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
65
In April of the preceding year, Platt Smith, as part of his efforts to com-
bat the effects of the depression on railroad construction, wrote to several
prominent personages gathering views concerning state aid for railroads. In
a letter to Senator James W. Grimes, a Republican and Lowe's predecessor
as governor, he expressed the view that state aid would be popularly sup-
58. Iowa v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388, 399 (1862).
59. Id at 399-400.
60. Id at 403. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
61. Id at 404.
62. Id at 409.
63. Id
64. Id at 409-10.
65. D. CLARK, SAMUEL JORDAN KIRKWOOD 126 (1917).
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ported in counties along the line of the Dubuque and Pacific. 66 Two months
later, he wrote Governor Lowe, requesting that a special session of the legis-
lature be convened to submit a proposal concerning state aid to the voters in
October. 67
In a letter dated June 22, Lowe objected to the haste required to comply
with legal requirements, and proposed an alternative scheme in which the
state would issue bonds, and use the proceeds to purchase materials used in
railroad construction, which materials would be sold to the railroads (after
the railroads had prepared the roadbeds on which the materials were to be
used) for bonds issued by the railroads and bearing at least one percent more
interest than the state bonds. Should all railroads agree on such a scheme,
and public opinion approve, a special session could be called.68
In his response, Smith suggested a convention at which supporters of
railroad construction could agree on a course of action, 69 and Lowe agreed
that a convention should be held "at some central point. . . soon after the
election. ' '70 In November, United States Senator James Harlan, whose sec-
ond term in the Senate would be decided upon by the state legislature
elected in 1859, wrote to Lowe expressing doubts about the prospect of state
aid to railroad construction:
Independent of the cry of extravagance, which Demagogues would
be certain to raise, would it not give our opponents the voters along
the lines of these roads, sufficient to swamp our small majority in
the State at large, and, also, enable them to so distribute them as to
carry the Senate and the House? And if so, would all the good
growing out of the more rapid completion of these public works,
compensate for the loss of the control of the State Government,
and our position in the ranks of Republican States in 1860, when
our vote, as a state, may elect a President of the United States?
These are considerations that doubtless have been, or will be ma-
turely considered by you before your influence will have been cast
for or against the proposition. 7'
The convention concerning aid to the railroads, held in Iowa City in
December of 1858, voted "in favor of a judicious system of State aid to such
Railroads as are of State importance to an amount not exceeding eight mil-
lions of dollars" and requested the governor to convene a special legislative
66. Letter from Platt Smith to James Grimes (April 6, 1858) (on file at 8D5.1 of the Illinois Central
Archives, Newberry Library, Chicago, Ill.).
67. Letter from Platt Smith to Ralph Lowe (June 7, 1858) (on file at 8D5.1 of the Illinois Central
Archives, Newberry Library, Chicago, Ill.).
68. Letter from Ralph Lowe to Platt Smith (June 22, 1858) (on file at 8D5.1 of the Illinois Central
Archives, Newberry Library, Chicago, Ill.).
69. Letter from Platt Smith to Ralph Lowe (July 10, 1858) (Governors' correspondence on file at
721 of the Iowa State Dep't of History and Archives, Des Moines, Iowa).
70. Ralston, Governor Ralph P. Lowe and State Aid to Railroads. Iowa Politics in 1859, 58 IOWA J.
HISTORY 207, 212 (1960).
71. Letter from James Harlan to Ralph Lowe (Nov. 11, 1858) (Governors' correspondence on fie at
637 of the Iowa State Dep't of History and Archives, Des Moines, Iowa).
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session.72 A minority report, written by Kirkwood, objected that any such
system would require an amendment to the state constitution, 73 a view that
was hinted at in 1856, the year of the federal land grants, by Governor
James W. Grimes in his first biennial message:
The Constitution wisely provides that the State shall not in
any manner create a debt exceeding one hundred thousand dollars.
The framers of that instrument did not imagine that there was a
great necessity to prohibit the counties from creating large public
debts, for the reason that the history of the count did not then
present the case of a county becoming a large stockholder in pri-
vate corporations.
Without stopping to inquire into the authority under which
loans have heretofore been voted, it seems to me that prudence and
sound policy requires [sic] that some check be imposed upon the
future exercise of this power to create public indebtedness.
74
In May of 1859, prior to the Republican convention, Grimes wrote to
Kirkwood that:
Our democrats are all for Lowe, of course. They hope his
nomination & then they will publish some of his foolish letters in
favor of state aid written by him last autumn. . . Outside of Lee,
Polk & Du Buque counties I do not know any body in favor of his
nomination in our party.
75
Kirkwood was elected governor within a year of signing the minority report
dissenting from the position taken by the convention. The following year,
1860, the legislature passed an act prohibiting future bond assistance by
subordinate political units,76 a declaration whose passage may well have
been facilitated by the fact that town bonds in aid of railroad construction
had been legislatively approved in only one instance since the 1857 enact-
ments.
77
Eight years later, however, in 1868, the General Assembly authorized
townships, towns, or incorporated cities to assist railroads by turning over to
them as a gift the proceeds of taxes approved by popular vote.78 The follow-
ing year, the Supreme Court of Iowa ruled that such an act was unconstitu-
tional because it could not be upheld
without sanctioning the. . . principle. . [ihat it is competent for
the legislature, because of the incidental advantage which would re-
sult to the communityfrom the carrying out of the objects of a volun-
72. Ralston, supra note 70, at 215.
73. Id at 216.
74. 2 THE MESSAGES AND PROCLAMATIONS OF THE GOVERNORS OF IOWA 37 (B. Shambaugh ed.
1903).
75. Letter from James Grimes to Samuel Kirkwood (May 29, 1859), reprinted in Letters ofJames W.
Grimes, 22 ANNALS OF IOWA 469, 499-500 (3d ser. 1940).
76. Revision of 1860, ch. 55, art. 8.
77. An Act Legalizing Certain Bonds Issued by the City of Comanche, ch. 68, 1860 Iowa Acts 79.
78. An Act to Enable Townships and Incorporated Towns and Cities to Aid in the Construction of
Railroads, ch. 48, 1868 Iowa Acts 54.
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tary private railway corporation, organized/or pecuniary profit, to
authorize a tax to be levied on the citizen and hisproperty, to be given
as a bounty to such private corporation, to be used in aid of its under-
taking, without any pecuniary compensation to the tax payer being
contemplated or provided.79
It noted, however, that such a holding about legislative competence was
technically dictum, since "It is absolutely impossible. . . to hold the act of
1868' to be valid, and yet stand by the decision in the Wapello County
Case ... . "80
The next legislature, meeting in 1870, authorized subordinate political
units to vote taxes in aid of railroad construction, in an act which differed
from that passed in 1868 primarily because it required railway corporations
to show that they had already expended on construction double the amount
of the proceeds given them rather than that they had already spent an
amount equal to the tax.8 The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the 1870
legislative act in an opinion joined by the sole dissenter from the decision
invalidating the 1868 statute and dissented from by the only other member
of the panel who had been a judge of the Supreme Court of Iowa when the
1868 legislation was invalidated. 82 As to that earlier legislation, the court
noted that "[i]f this case but involved a second time the validity of the act of
1868. . . we might regard the question as to that act settled by [the earlier]
case, but as the general assembly has re-asserted its authority and re-enacted
the law with important modifications, we have treated the question as still
an open one . . .,83 In terms of judicial precedents, it distinguished the
earlier decisions on the following basis:
The real decision, in the Wapello County case was, that the legisla-
ture had never authorized the municipal corporations of this State
to subscribe stock to railroads, issue bonds and levy and collect
taxes to pay the same, and that those municipal corporations pos-
sessed no power independent of express legislative authority to
subscribe to the stock of railroad companies, issue bonds therefor,
and levy and collect local taxes to pay the same. To that decision,
and to the whole series of decisions of this court holding invalid
county and city bonds, issued for that purpose, we give our unqual-
ified approval. But it is given on the grounds that the general as-
sembly had never passed any act conferring the power, and that
without such legislation it did not exist.84
This series of decisions puts in question the position of Mr. Justice
Miller that "[the Wapello County) case may now be considered as finally
settling the law. . . in the courts of Iowa. . . .It is altogether improbable
79. Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 58 (1869).
80. Id at 38.
81. An Act to Enable Townships, Incorporated Towns, and Cities to Aid in the Construction of
Railroads, ch. 102, 1870 Iowa Acts 105.
82. Stewart v. Board of Supervisors of Polk County, 30 Iowa 9 (1970).
83. Id. at 11-12.
84. Id at 29.
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that any serious effort will ever be made to shake its force in that
State .... ,,85 Specifically as to the nature and source of law in Wapello
County in other words, it could be argued that the history of Lowe's guber-
natorial years demonstrates that, in reality, it is the background of the judge
rather than the "decision of the court" that "makes the law."
86
IV. THE PRECEDENT OF GELPCKE v CITY OF DUBuQuE
A)
Throughout the 1850's, both Whigs and Democrats in the General As-
sembly supported legislation aimed at revising the Constitution of 1846.
Twice the legislature, controlled by Democrats, enacted bills calling for a
public referendum on the question, and twice the Democratic governor ve-
toed them. The second veto message, in 1853, although based on technical
grounds, expressed "a deep concern at the opinion entertained by some por-
tion of the people, in favor of. . . the establishment of banks, of special acts
of incorporation for pecuniary profit, and of contracting debts without limi-
tation by the General Assembly. ' 87 What the Governor was referring to was
article 8, section 2 of the Constitution of 1846, which provided:
Corporations shall not be created in this State by special laws,
except for political or municipal purposes; but the General Assem-
bly shall provide, by general laws, for the organization of all other
corporations, except corporations with banking privileges, the crea-
tion of which is prohibited. The stockholders shall be subject to
such liabilities and restrictions as shall be provided by law. The
State shall not directly or indirectly become a stockholder in any
corporation.
After Republican James W. Grimes won election as governor in 1854,
the legislature passed a referundum measure, and the constitutional conven-
tion approved by the voters met in Iowa City on January 19, 1857. Follow-
ing in the tradition of their Whig predecessors, the Republicans succeded in
obtaining approval for the establishment of banking, as well as a clause in-
creasing the state debt limit from $100,000 to $250,000.88
With the exception of banking, the issue which occupied the most time
during the proceedings of the Convention was whether the freedom of cities
and counties to incur bonded indebtedness should be limited.8
9 Because cer-
tain political units had already incurred considerable debt, the argument
that it would be unfair to deny such an opportunity to other cities and coun-
ties, together with a disagreement as to whether the situation should be
treated in the Constitution or left to legislative action, resulted in a provision
85. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 175, 219 (1863).
86. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
87. 1 THE MESSAGES AND PROCLAMATIONS OF THE GOVERNORS OF IOWA 476-78 (B. Shambaugh
ed. 1903).
88. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
89. Herriott, Iowa's Treasury Decit in Light ofthe Constitutional Debates, 3 ANNALS OF IOWA 631,
638 (3d ser. 1899).
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limiting the indebtedness of cities and counties to five percent of their taxa-
ble property.90
Ralph Lowe was the first governor elected under the Constitution of
1858; and it is my contention that this constitutes the most significant histori-
cal fact in light of which the Wapello County decision must be assessed.
Thus, the reason the Wapello County opinion felt free to argue "that this
court as now constituted must pass upon [the constitutionality of city and
county bonded indebtedness] as an original question, wholly unaffected by
the doctrine of stare decisis"9' appears to be, not only that constitutional
action had been taken on county debts, but also that the one significant
change made by the convention in connection with the judiciary consisted of
providing for the popular election of judges. Even members of the conven-
tion who regarded their constituents as satisfied with the activities of the
judicial branch agreed that the public demanded that future supreme courts
be different, in that they consist of judges elected by the people rather than
the legislature.92
()
Analyzing Gelpcke in terms of federalism, as the legal historians have
done, 93 seems justified by the fact that the dispute presented to the courts
developed as a result of the disparity between the attitudes towards internal
improvements held by Iowa Democrats and the national party.94 If one is
concerned with Gelpcke's significance as a precedent, however, it seems in-
appropriate to focus on process rather than substance, on whether state or
federal law should apply rather than on the question of the content of the
applicable law.
The law at issue in Gelpeke was a public act making all members of a
political unit liable for the debts of a private enterprise after the majority of
the voting members of that unit in effect determined that the private enter-
prise was fulfilling a public function. The question presented, in terms of
legal history, is the contemporary meaning of Ge/pcke: the significance of
the Supreme Court's refusal to follow a state court's determination that such
an act was unconstitutional.
The precedential significance of that refusal as a source of law-making
authority for the federal courts was significantly undercut by the promulga-
tion of the Erie v. Tompkins doctrine in diversity cases. If one views Gelpcke
in terms of the substantive content of the rule it was applying, however, it
presents the issue of the extent to which judicial enforcement of constitu-
tional guarantees could be permitted to override the need to achieve stability
90. See 2 THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF IOWA 1033 (W.
Blair Lord, reporter 1857).
91. Iowa v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388, 395 (1862).
92. See 1 THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF IOWA 254, 257
(W. Blair Lord, reporter 1857).
93. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
94. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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and uniformity in legal rules affecting rights to property. So viewed, analy-
sis of Mr. Justice Miller's objection to the position taken by the Ge/pcke
majority serves to clarify the issues presented by Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks.
The precise issue raised by Flagg Brothers is whether the storage busi-
ness obtained by a warehouseman in connection with eviction proceedings is
sufficient in magnitude to justify imposition of the financial burdens entailed
by procedural due process requirements and constitutionally imposed upon
public agencies. That the issue delineated above, rather than one involving
considerations of federalism, is what separates the Flagg majority and the
dissent seems clear from the statement in the latter's opinion that, "under the
Court's analysis as I understand it, the state statute in this case would not be
subject to due process scrutiny in a state court." 95 What the Flagg majority
holds, in other words, is that eviction did not makes Brooks' situation vis-a-
vis the warehouseman sufficiently different from other persons storing goods
with Flagg Brothers, Inc. to justify the judiciary in treating Flagg Brothers
differently from warehousemen who do not cooperate with the State in evic-
tion proceedings.
The dissent's objection to that holding is both that it violates "the as-
sumption that the State will control nonconsensual deprivations of prop-
erty" 96 and that the rule promulgated by the majority is 'foreclosed by...
prior decisions. ",97 Wapello County, however, can be read to hold that, in
connection with application of a legal rule affecting rights to property, it is
unconstitutional to regard dissenters as bound by the determination that a
private enterprise is fulfilling a public function, and the Gelpcke dissent can
be read to recognize that such a constitutional prohibition takes precedence
over the need for stability in judicial decisions that constituted the underpin-
ning for the Gelpcke majority's holding. The number of persons in any
given political unit who get evicted will, of course, almost always exceed the
number of warehousemen located within that unit who deal with the State.
In the municipal bond cases, however, it was also almost always the case
that those who voted against the issuance of bonds assisting railroad con-
struction constituted a minority within the community.
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial precedents function in this society as limitations on the rights
of the majority, and Gelpcke dealt with the question of the nature and source
of those limitations in the context of individual property rights. The need to
protect such rights, which provided the basis for the limitations on legislative
95. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 177 n.15 (1978).
96. Id at 178.
97. Id at 169.
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action enunciated by Judge Lowe, seems also to constitute the rationale for
the limitations on judicial action delineated in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks. It is in this sense that the Ge/pcke dissent seems to me to function
as a precedent for today.
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